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ABSTRACT 
The governments of the fifty states of the United States have made promises to past and present employees 
regarding retirement benefits-predominately pensions and healthcare coverage. The issues surrounding the 
pension obligations made to these employees have been well examined but the obligations due to promises of 
healthcare coverage have not received as much attention.  There is great variance among the OPEB liability 
reported by the states.  This study examines reasons for the variance.  The future payment of healthcare 
obligations, like pensions, will put extreme stress on states in the future if the impact of these promises is not 
understood now.  Understanding the influence healthcare assumptions have on the reported liabilitites is an 
important step to understanding these liabilities. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
  In  2004,  GASB  45  Accounting  and  Financial 
Reporting by Employers for Post-Employment Benefits 
Other  Than  Pensions  required  state  and  local 
governments  to  report  their  non-pension  Post-
Employment  Benefits  (OPEB)  as  liabilities  on  their 
financial  statements  starting  after  December,  2006. 
These  liabilities  are  dominated  by  healthcare  benefits 
granted to retirees.  Up until this point, state and local 
governments reported the cost of these benefits on a “pay 
as you go” basis.  GASB 45 required governments, for 
the first time, to report the value of healthcare promises 
made to retirees.  The purpose of this study is to examine 
the  OPEB  liabilities  reported  by  the  states.  The  OPEB 
liabilities vary widely among the states; this study examines 
potential causes for the variance.  States reported a total of 
over $638 billion in OPEB liabilities in 2009 (PCT, 2011).  
It is important that the numbers reported by the states are 
accurate and reliable so good decisions regarding funding 
and future benefits can be made. 
1.1. Why OPEBS are Important  
  During  2009,  states  reported  an  average  OPEB 
liability  of  over  $9  billion  and  growing.    According  to 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, the rate of healthcare inflation in 
2008  has  been  close  to  10%  and  shows  no  signs  of 
slowing down  (PWC, 2008). Changes in  the  healthcare 
laws have added uncertainty to the future of healthcare in 
the  United  States.    States  are  examining  the  retirement 
benefits  promised  to  their  employees  to  determine  if 
changes are necessary.  The recent upheaval in Wisconsin 
shows  how  important  benefits  are  to  state  workers  and 
how difficult it is to change them.   
  Public attention has focused on the status of states’ 
unfunded  pensions.    During  2009,  a  $660  billion  gap 
between  pension  liabilities  and  pension  assets  existed 
(PCT,  2011).    Less  widely  discussed  is  the  funding 
concerns  caused  by  OPEBS.    At  the  current  time, 
funding for OPEBs is not required which means there is 
great potential for the gap between obligations to retirees 
and the ability to pay for them to widen.  In fact, in 2009, 
only $31 billion had been contributed towards the $638 
billion in OPEB liability  (PCT, 2011).  For some states, 
the future financial burden for OPEBs will be minimal; for 
example,  Nebraska  does  not  offer  retirees  healthcare 
benefits. For other states these large, unfunded liabilities 
will become a greater problem in the future.  For example, 
New York has over $56 billion in OPEB liabilities, none 
of which are funded.  The requirements for governments Catherine Plante / American Journal of Economics and Business Administration 4 (2) (2012) 122-128 
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to report OPEB liabilities may provide a wake-up call to 
many states to the financial burden the retirement benefits 
promised  to  past  and  present  employees  will  cause  to 
future generations. 
  This study examines the OPEB liabilities reported 
by state governments in order to understand differences 
in the liability among the states and underlying causes 
for the differences. The magnitude of these liabilities and 
the financial stresses on the states makes it imperative 
that  the  reported  numbers  for  the  OPEB  liabilities  are 
accurate and reliable.  As more and more states are faced 
with crucial decisions about the ability to pay current and 
future  commitments  while  examining  if  and  how 
commitments to their employees should be changed, an 
understanding  of  how  the  numbers  are  calculated  and 
how assumptions affect the calculations is necessary for 
good decision making.   
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
2.1. Data  
  The 2009 Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports 
(CAFRs) of the 50 states are examined to determine the 
OPEB  assumptions  made  when  calculating  the  OPEB 
liability.  Not all states report information regarding their 
OPEB in their CAFR.  For example, Nebraska does not 
report OPEB information because they do not offer an 
OPEB plan.  Thus Nebraska is not included in the sample.  
Other states do not report their OPEB data either because 
they  are  multi-employer  plans  and  currently  are  not 
required  to  report  the  numbers  or  they  created  an 
independent  trust  fund  that  issues  its  own  financial 
statements.  Requests for information were made to any 
state’s  OPEB  plan  that  did  not  report  actuarial 
assumptions in their CAFR.  Four states (Arizona, New 
Jersey,  Oklahoma  and  South  Carolina)  did  not  respond 
and therefore are not included in the sample.  Forty-five 
states are included in the sample.   
  Of  the  forty-five  states  examined,  the  reported 
OPEB  liability  varies  widely  from  the  $67  million 
reported by South Dakota to the $69 billion reported by 
California. However, these numbers may be misleading. 
States with large numbers of potential retirees will have 
larger liabilities because a larger number of people are 
receiving  coverage.    The  variable  potential  retirees  is 
calculated as the number of  state employees  who are 
currently  retired  plus  the  number  of  current  full  time 
employees  which  represents  the  number  of  people 
covered by the plan.  Using the total number of past and 
present employees to scale the OPEB liability will allow 
a  better  comparison  between  states  by  controlling  for 
size.  The importance of scaling is exhibited in Table 1.   
2.2. Variables  
  In 2009, variations among the OPEB liabilities per 
potential retiree reported by the states are large.  This 
study examines the potential sources of the variation by 
examining five factors.  The first factor is the liability 
itself and the underlying assumptions used to calculate 
the liability.  The second factor examined is economies 
of scale.   The third factor is the  states’ ability to pay 
while the fourth factor is the cost of healthcare faced by 
the  individual  states.    The  fifth  factor  is  the  level  of 
benefits provided by the states to their employees.  By 
examining these five factors, a better understanding of 
the variation in the reported liabilities and the underlying 
factors related to the liability should be achieved.   
  The first factor examined is the OPEB liability itself.  
Like pensions, the OPEB liability is based on actuarial 
assumptions.    Two  major  assumptions  used  for  both 
pensions  and  OPEB  calculations  are  the  discount  rate 
and  return  on  investment  assumption.    These  two 
assumptions often are the same. Thirty-eight of the forty-
five states reported a discount rate/return on investment 
rate.  Of these thirty-eight, thirty-three assumed a rate 
between 4-5%.  There is very little variance among the 
states  regarding  these  assumptions.  Since  only  thirty-
eight states report this assumption and because there is 
little  variance  among  the  states  regarding  this 
assumption, it is not included in the analysis to preserve 
sample size (Including these assumptions in the analysis 
did not affect the results). 
  What  makes  the  OPEB  liability  unique  from  the 
pension  liability  is  the  third  assumption-healthcare 
inflation rate.  The healthcare inflation rate assumption is 
the rate the state assumes healthcare costs are going to 
increase by in the future (no state assumes a decrease in 
costs)  when  calculating  their  OPEB  liability.    This 
healthcare  inflation  rate  assumption  is  particularly 
interesting because there is little guidance as to how to 
determine the value.  GASB 45 says that it should be 
partially  based  on  past  experience  but  the  emphasis 
should be on long term future trends.  This emphasis on 
“crystal  ball  gazing”  makes  the  healthcare  assumption 
particularly interesting to examine during these times of 
turbulence in the healthcare industry.  States with higher 
assumed rates of healthcare cost increases should have 
higher liabilities. In fact, as Keating and Berman (2007) 
found,  the  assumptions  made  regarding  healthcare 
inflation rates are a cost driver to the reported liability.  
The  rate  assumed  by  the  states  varies  widely.    The Catherine Plante / American Journal of Economics and Business Administration 4 (2) (2012) 122-128 
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healthcare inflation rate assumed by the states in 2009 
varies from a rate of 6%, assumed by West Virginia to 
a  rate  of  13.6%  assumed  by  Idaho.    Some  may 
question  whether  the  healthcare  rate  assumed  is 
important.    Corporations,  under  FASB  106,  have  to 
report the impact of a 1% increase in the assumption 
on  the  reported  OPEB  liability.    Looking  at  the  50 
largest  US  corporations  that  provide  healthcare  to 
their retirees in 2009, a 1% increase in the healthcare 
assumptions corresponds to a $215 million increase in 
the liability.   This analysis may be understating the 
importance of the healthcare assumption because the 
$215 million is based on an average OPEB liability of 
$3.4 billion for corporations while the states included 
in the sample have an average of $9.1 billion in OPEB 
liability.  Thus, the potential to overstate or understate 
the OPEB liability is great.  All 45 states included in 
the sample reported their assumed rate of increase for 
future  healthcare  costs.  It  is  expected  that  the 
healthcare  assumption assumed by the states should 
be  positively  related  to  the  OPEB  liability  per 
potential retiree.    
 
Table 1. OPEB liabilities by state 
  -------------2009 OPEB liability--------------    ------------2009 OPEB liab/potential retiree----------- 
1  California  $ 69,351,300,000  1  Connecticut  $ 226,999 
2  New York  $ 56,286,000,000  2  Alaska  $ 194,766 
3  Texas  $ 53,890,544.000  3  Delaware  $ 135,230 
4  Thiois  $ 43,949,729,000  4  Iiiionis  $ 134,436 
5  Ohio  $ 43,360,893,000  5  Michigan  $ 132,705 
6  Michigan  $ 41,419,600,000  6  Hawaii  $ 126,685 
7  North Carolina  $ 33,814,515,000  7  North Carolina  $ 194,786 
8  Connecticut  $ 20,284,637,000  8  West Virginia  $ 135,230 
9  Georgin  $ 17,407,621,000  9  Georgia  $ 134,436 
10  Alaska  $ 16,098,602,000  10  Ohio  $ 132,705 
11  Pennsylcvania  $ 15,166,300,000  11  New Hampshire  $ 126,685 
12  Maryland  $ 14,919,073,000  12  Texas  $ 118,786 
13  Massachusetts  $ 11,512,100,000  13  Maryland  $ 99,525 
14  Alabama  $ 10,791,300,000  14  Alabama  $ 98,906 
15  Louisiana  $ 8,754,555,000  15  Masschusetts  $ 98,864 
16  Hawaii  $ 7,618,372,000  16  New York  $ 98,276 
17  Kentucky  $ 6,362,640,000  17  Vermont  $ 95,352 
18  Wahington  $ 5,830,000,000  18  Califormia  $ 94,795 
19  West Virginia  $ 5,636,000,000  19  Louisiana  $ 92,128 
20  Delaware  $ 3,742,846,000  20  Maine  $ 85,582 
21  Florida  $ 3,321,637,000  21   Kentucky  $ 85,510 
22  Missouri  $ 3,226,105,000  22  Pennsylvania  $ 72,394 
23  New Hampshire  $ 3,116,916,000  23  New Mexico  $ 69,349 
24  New Mexico  $ 2,625,963,000  24  Nevada  $ 60,414 
25  Maine  $ 2,326,834,000  25  Washington  $ 54,125 
26  Wisconsin  $ 2,043,914,000  26  Virginia  $ 53,694 
27  Colorado  $ 1,874,005,000  27  Rhode island  $ 43,280 
28  Nevada  $ 1,865,879,000  28  Missouri  $ 36,715 
29  Arkansas  $ 1,136,601,000  29  Arkansas  $ 36,665 
30  Tennessee  $ 1,865,809,000  30  Colorado  $ 27,489 
31  Vermont  $ 1,746,879,000  31  Wisconsin  $ 22,021 
32  Minnesota  $ 1,628,934,000  32  Montana  $ 19,515 
33  Phode island  $ 1,136,601,000  33  Idaho  $ 17,478 
34  Mississppi  $ 788,189,000  34  Tennsessee  $ 14,563 
35  Oregon  $ 727,711,000  35  Florida  $ 12,520 
36  Montana  $ 555,047,000  36  Mississippi  $ 11,335 
37  Lowa  $ 540,894,000  37  Utah  $ 11,146 
38  Indiana  $ 538,200,000  38  North Dakot  $ 10,123 
39  Idaho  $ 524,859,000  39  Wyoring  $ 6,645 
40  Utah  $ 493,746,000  40  Mnnesota  $ 6,395 
41  Kansas  $ 480,752,000  41  Lowa  $ 6,222 
42  Wyoming  $ 236,910,000  42  Oregon  $ 6,214 
43  North Dakota  $ 174,161,000  43  Idiana  $ 4,536 
44  South Dakota  $ 161,376,000  44  Kansas  $ 2,488 
45  South Dakota  $ 67,100,000  45  South Dakota  $ 2,379 Catherine Plante / American Journal of Economics and Business Administration 4 (2) (2012) 122-128 
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  An economy of scale is the second factor that may 
explain  the  differences  in  the  liability  per  potential 
retiree  reported  among  the  states.  The  number  of 
potential retirees in the state may indicate economies 
of scale exist with states with more employees having 
a benefit over states with fewer employees.  Taking 
this  idea  one  step  further-the  number  of  potential 
retirees  per  population  may  also  indicate  whether 
economies of scale exist within the state employees’ 
healthcare plans.  The percentage of people that are 
employed by the state measures whether states employ 
a  larger  number  of  workers  relative  to  the  state’s 
overall  population  or  whether  they  run  leaner 
operations.  States with a higher percentage of state 
employees may enjoy economies of scale because of 
their  political  clout.    If  a  larger  proportion  of  the 
state’s  population  works  for  the  state,  for  example, 
that may give the states’ benefit officers greater power 
to  negotiate  better  terms  for  their  healthcare  plans.  
The  two  variables,  states’  potential  retirees  and  the 
percent  of  the  state’s  population  that  are  potential 
retirees, should be negatively related to the cost per 
person if the states are enjoying economies of scale. 
Additionally,  because  2009  was  a  recession  year  and 
therefore may skew the number of state employees, the 
percent change in the number of state employees from 
2005-2009  is  also  included  as  a  control  variable.  No 
prediction as to sign for this variable is made.   
  The third factor that may explain the differences in 
the  reported  liabilities  among  the  states  may  be  the 
differences in their ability to pay for healthcare for their 
retirees.    Poorer  states  may  have  to  offer  more  bare-
bones plans than states with more resources.  The ability 
of a state to pay for healthcare is measured using several 
variables.  The first variable is the per capita income of 
the  state’s  population.    The  assumption  is  that  richer 
taxpayers  lead  to  higher  taxes  thereby  giving  states 
greater ability to offer more generous plans than states 
with poorer taxpayers that may require more government 
services.  Per capita income is expected to be positively 
related to the liability per potential retiree. The second 
variable is the amount that the state’s revenue exceeded 
the state’s expenditures in 2007 divided by the state’s 
population.  This “net income per person” indicates the 
resources available to the state to pay healthcare  fees.  
States that keep expenses lower than revenues have more 
financial  flexibility  and  thus  may  be  able  to  provide 
more healthcare  to their employees.   “Net income per 
person”  is  expected  to  be  positively  related  to  the 
liability  per  potential  retiree.  The  third  variable  is  the 
unfunded pension liability per potential retiree.  If the 
states are unwilling or unable to fund their pensions, they 
may  be  unwilling  or  unable  to  offer  more  healthcare 
coverage  to  their  employees  and/or  require  the 
employees  to  cover  more  of  their  insurance  premiums 
which decreases their liabilities. This variable should be 
negatively  related  to  the  OPEB  liability.  The  fourth 
variable is the state’s contributions toward their OPEB 
liability  in  2009.    Theoretically,  states  with  higher 
liabilities should be contributing more towards them.  If 
a state has the resources to fund their obligations, they 
may  be  more  likely  to  grant  their  employees  higher 
benefits.  It  is  predicted  that  contributions  will  be 
positively related to the liability. 
  The fourth factor that may explain the differences 
among  the  states’  liabilities  is  the  cost  of  healthcare 
itself.    Some  parts  of  the  country  may  have  higher 
healthcare costs than other parts.  Looking at a state’s 
expenditures  on  healthcare  may  be  related  to  state 
employee healthcare costs faced by the states but may 
also  reflect  the  generosity  of  the  state  in  paying 
healthcare  costs  for  the  poor  and  the  elderly  of  their 
states.    The  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  explain  the 
differences  in  reported  healthcare  liabilities  for  public 
employees  and  retirees  and  not  how  much  states  are 
expending on  healthcare for all. The state’s  healthcare 
expenditures  cannot  be  broken  into  employees’ 
expenditures  and  overall  expenditures.    Therefore,  to 
proxy  for  the  differences  in  the  cost  of  providing 
healthcare  to  state  employees  among  the  states,  a 
variable “insurance premiums” is used.  This variable is 
the average cost in each state of purchasing healthcare 
insurance for family coverage in the year 2009.   This 
variable  reflects  differences  in  healthcare  costs  among 
states.  If healthcare costs are higher in New York, the 
premium for healthcare insurance should be higher.  This 
variable  proxies  for  differences  in  healthcare  costs 
among the states and should be positively related to the 
OPEB liability. 
  The fifth factor is differences in healthcare liabilities 
may exist because of differences in the benefits given to 
retirees.  States that provide  more generous healthcare 
plans should have higher healthcare liabilities than states 
that  provide  more  modest  coverage.    To  measure  the 
amount  of  the  healthcare  benefits  provided  to  state 
employees, the percentage of the government employees 
that are covered by a collective bargaining agreement is 
used.    It  is  assumed  that  the  more  unionized  the 
employees are, the better the benefits they will receive.  
Historically, unionization and better benefits have been 
related  (Buchmueller  et  al.,  2002).    Although  many 
states are currently negotiating with their public unions Catherine Plante / American Journal of Economics and Business Administration 4 (2) (2012) 122-128 
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to trim pensions and benefits, it is assumed that unions still 
have  a  positive  impact  on  the  amount  of  healthcare 
insurance  provided.    Therefore,  states  with  higher  union 
representation should have higher healthcare liabilities per 
potential retiree because they offer more generous plans. 
  To further explore differences in coverage provided, 
the  amount  of  pension  liability  per  potential  retiree  is 
also included in the model.  It is assumed that states with 
generous  pension  plans  will  offer  generous  healthcare 
plans.  Both  the  percent  of  potential  retirees  covered 
under a collective bargaining agreement and the pension 
liability per potential retiree should be positively related 
to  the  OPEB  liability.    Descriptive  statistics  for  the 
variables  discussed  above,  their  sources  and  their 
expected sign are reported in Table 2.   
  As shown in Table 2, there is a wide variation in 
most  variables.  This  table  indicates  there  is  little 
consistency among the states with regards to how much 
they  owe  in  OPEB  liabilities,  the  assumptions  made 
which are the basis of these liabilities and to the amount 
they contribute towards the healthcare liabilities. 
  To examine what factors influence a state’s reported 
OPEB liability, the following regression is used: 
 
  OPEB/potential  retiree  =  healthcare  assumption  + 
potential  retiree+  potential  retiree  /population  +  % 
change  in  #  employees  +  per  capita  income  +  “net 
income”  /  population  +  unfunded  pension/potential 
retiree + contributions/potential retiree + premium costs 
+ percent unionized + pension liability/potential retiree. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Expected sign mean  Mean  Std Dev.  Min  Max 
Open liab/ potential retirees  +  $57,673  $ 54,964   $ 2,379  $ 226,999 
Healthcare assumption  -  0.0923  0.015  0.06  0.136 
Potential retirees  -  183,503  188,025  22,501  1,000,038 
Potential retirees /population    0.035  0.017  0.019  0.128 
Percent change employees    0.0526  0.045  -0.027  0.0143 
Per capita income  +  $37,632  $ 7,452  $ 3,229  $ 54,397 
Net income/population  +  $1,384  $ 7,840  $ 243  $ 5,436 
Unfunded pension retirees  -  $70,814  $ 44,243  $ 2,230  $ 5,436 
Contribution/potential retirees  +  $1,624  $ 1,633  $ -  $ 6,816 
Premium costs  +  $12,896  $ 928  $ 10,969  $ 14,723 
Unionization  +  38%  18%  11%  73% 
Pension liability potential retirees  +  $298,167  $ 97,346  $ 171,719  $ 648,543 
Number of state employees  Full-time employees -2009 annual survey of public employment and payroll-U.S census bureau 
Number of retirees  Number of state employees retirees 2001-2002-U.S census bureau 
OPEB liability   OPEB liability for 2009-PEW center on the states-the widening gap April 2011 
Health care assumption  Individual state’s 2009 CAFRs 
Population  2009 resident population by state U.S census bureau 
Percentage of change in employees  Full time employees -2005 annual survey of public employees and payroll U.S census bureau 
Per capita income   Per capita personal income by state for 2009-U.S census bureau 
State revenues  Total revenue by state 2007 U.S. census bureau 
Unfunded pension   Dollar amount of the state pension that is unfunded is 2009 -PEW center on the states the widening gap April 2011 
Contributions   2009 contributions made by the states towards their OPEB-REW center on the states the widening gap April 2011 
Percent unionized  Percent of public employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement 2010 current population survey 
Pension liability   2009 total pension liability for state employees -REW center on the state the widening gap April 2011 
 
Table 3. Regression results  
  Coefficients  Standard error  t Stat  P-value 
Intercept  -50058.466010000  75638.957690000  -0.661807983  0.5126894710 
Health assump 2009  -886045.592800000  299850.387500000  -2.954958972  0.0057317910 
Potential retirees  0.045862346  0.023996770  1.911188315  0.0646986760 
#Emp+ret/pop  192185.842500000  565621.693700000  0.339778061  0.7361768460 
Percentage of Change  143512.689300000  98016.970930000  1.464161644  0.1526117090 
Per capita income  0.485695639  0.665241276  0.730104485  0.4704778670 
Net income per capita  -9.917287242  9.185804774  -1.079631833  0.2881340880 
Unfunded pen/emp+ret  0.342123436  0.108568916  3.151209853  0.0034485060 
Contrib/employee+ret  24.186699650  3.033630074  7.972857290  3.3869E-0900 
Premium costs  10.393861090  5.277396993  1.969505251  0.0573373130 
Percent unionized  39.474047150  251.288133600  0.157086793  0.8761336320 
Pen liab/emp+ret  -0.123307890  0.061610156  -2.001421631  0.0536254472 
R square 0.855351335; Observations; 45 Catherine Plante / American Journal of Economics and Business Administration 4 (2) (2012) 122-128 
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Where: 
Potential retirees  =  Number  of  state 
employees+  number  of 
state retirees 
% change in employees =  Percent  change  in  number 
of  state  employees  from 
2005-2009 
Net income / population =  (State  revenue-state 
expenditures)/population 
 
  The results are presented in Table 3. 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
  The  results  indicate  that  six  of  the  variables 
examined are significantly related to the OPEB liability 
yet not always in the direction expected.  The first factor 
examined  is  the  OEPB  liability  itself.    The  healthcare 
inflation  rate  assumed  is  significant  but  not  in  the 
predicted  direction.  Mathematically,  the  higher  the 
assumed healthcare inflation rate, the higher the liability 
but  the  results  show  that  governments  with  high 
liabilities  per  potential  retiree  are  assuming  lower 
healthcare costs.  The wide range in predicted healthcare 
inflation  rates  (6-13%)  indicate  either  there  is  a  wide 
variance  in  state’s  ability  to  control  future  healthcare 
costs or that states are having difficulty in determining 
what healthcare costs are going to do in the future.   It 
may  also  indicate  that  governments  with  higher 
healthcare  assumptions  maybe  over  estimating  their 
healthcare  liabilities  which  builds  slack  into  their 
reported numbers.  States with lower assumptions may 
be underreporting their liabilities.  It would behoove 
state  legislatures  to  examine  the  assumptions  that 
underlie the reported liability to understand how the 
reported  liability  is  dependent  upon  the  underlying 
assumptions and verify that the assumptions represent 
economic reality. 
  The second factor examined is economies of scale.  
The results indicate that states do not enjoy economies of 
scale when reporting healthcare liabilities.  States with a 
larger number of potential retirees  face  a  higher OPEB 
liability per potential retiree.  No evidence of economies 
of scales exists when negotiating healthcare costs; in fact, 
the results indicate the opposite.  These results indicate 
that  the  political  clout  of  large  numbers  of  covered 
employees  ensure  better  benefits  to  the  employees 
themselves rather than cost savings for the state.   
  The  third  factor  examined  is  the  states’  ability  to 
pay.  It is predicted that states with higher per capital 
income  and  higher  “net  income  per  capita”  will  offer 
better  healthcare  plans  causing  higher  liabilities  per 
potential retiree.  The model also predicts that states with 
large  unfunded  pension  liabilities  will  have  lower 
healthcare  liabilities  per  potential  retiree.    The  results 
show that neither the wealth of the state’s taxpayers as 
measured  by  per  capita  income  nor  the  state’s  fiscal 
restraint  as  measured  by  “net  income  per  capita” 
influence the level of liabilities reported.    However, the 
results are significant regarding unfunded pensions per 
potential  employee.    It  was  assumed  that  states  with 
difficulties  funding  pension  plans  would  not  have  the 
ability to finance large OPEB liabilities.  Instead, the 
results  indicate  that  states  that  don’t  fund  their 
pensions also incur large liabilities for healthcare.  It 
seems  that  states  with  pension  problems  also  have 
problems  with  large  OPEB  liabilities.    However, 
contribution per potential retire is positively related to 
the liability per potential retiree.  In 2009, states with 
higher liabilities per potential retiree contributed more 
towards their OPEB liabilities.  These results indicate 
that  governments  who  promise  a  lot  of  healthcare 
benefits are trying to fund the liabilities. States with 
large, unfunded pension liabilities seem to be trying to 
avoid  the  same  mistakes  with  these  newly  reported 
healthcare liabilities. 
  The fourth factor examined is the cost of healthcare 
faced by the states.  The results show premium costs are 
positively related to the reported liability.  The cost of 
insurance  premiums  is  used  to  proxy  for  the  cost  of 
healthcare in the state.  States with higher premiums and 
thus  higher  healthcare  costs  have  higher  liabilities  per 
potential retirees.  These results are logical and consistent. 
  The  fifth  factor  examined  is  the  level  of  benefits 
provided to total potential retirees.  Information on the 
level of benefits provided to employees is not available 
on a state by states basis.  Therefore, the percentage of 
the workforce that operates under a collective bargaining 
agreement and the pension liability per potential retiree 
proxy  for  the  level  of  healthcare  benefits  offered  to 
retirees.  Unionization is not significantly related to the 
liability  while  pension  liability  is  negatively  related.  
These results indicate that unionization does not impact 
the  level  of  healthcare  benefits  given.    However,  the 
results indicate that states with more generous pension 
plans have less generous healthcare plans.  It is possible 
that  states  are  trading  off  pension  benefits  with 
healthcare benefits when providing retirement coverage 
to employees.  The results may also indicate that it is 
easier to change healthcare coverage through increased 
co-pays than it is to change pension plans. Catherine Plante / American Journal of Economics and Business Administration 4 (2) (2012) 122-128 
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  In  summary,  states  with  higher  healthcare 
liabilities per potential retiree contribute more to their 
healthcare  liabilities  and  assume  lower  rates  of 
increases  in  healthcare  costs.    They  have  a  larger 
number  of  potential  retirees  and  lower  pension 
liabilities but these pension liabilities are more likely to 
be underfunded.  These states also face higher costs for 
the healthcare coverage they provide. 
4. CONCLUSION 
  This  study  finds  that  several  factors  influence  the 
OPEB liability per potential retiree. States that cover a 
larger number of employees have higher liabilities per 
potential retiree.  The large number of state employees, 
past and present, appears to be using their political clout 
to accrue better healthcare benefits for themselves rather 
than  the  states  accruing  the  benefits  of  large  numbers 
through lower costs per person.  Next, states with high 
pension  liabilities  per  person  have  lower  healthcare 
liabilities  per  person  while  states  with  high  unfunded 
pension  liabilities  per  person  have  higher  healthcare 
liabilities  per  person.    These  results  indicate  two 
different  things.    Firstly,  it  appears  that  states  make 
tradeoffs.  States that offer generous pension plans offer 
less  generous  healthcare  plans.    However,  states  that 
have problems with their pension plans because they are 
underfunded  appear  to  be  compensating  by  offering 
more  healthcare  coverage.  All  these  results  are 
interesting but further analysis is necessary.  The states 
are currently in a time of flux regarding their retirement 
benefits.  Examining these results again in a few years 
will be intriguing to see what changes have been made to 
state retirement benefits. 
  One  of  the  most  important  contributions  of  this 
study  is  the  examination  of  the  assumed  healthcare 
inflation rate.  So far, no other study has examined this 
assumption  as  made  by  the  states.    The  relationship 
between actuarial assumptions and pension liabilities has 
been  studied  but  little  research  has  looked  at  the 
relationship  between  actuarial  assumptions  and  the 
liability reported for the cost of providing healthcare to 
retirees.  Recall  the  estimates  ranged  from  6%  to  over 
13% in 2009.   This wide range of estimates calls into 
question  whether  the  OPEB  liabilities  currently  being 
reported by the states represents the “true” costs of these 
liabilities.    When  examining  the  fiscal  health  of  the 
states,  it  is  important  to  accurately  measure  the 
obligations  the  states  have  made  to  their  employees. 
Retirees’ healthcare costs are another “hidden” liability 
that  has  only  recently  appeared  on  state  and  local 
government’s financial statements.  It is possible that the 
wide range in healthcare assumptions accurately reflect 
the underlying liability.  It is also possible that the wide 
range in assumptions reflect the newness in reporting the 
OPEB  liability  and  the  difficulty  in  predicting  future 
healthcare  costs.    Either  way,  users  of  the  states’ 
financial  statements  should  be  aware  of  the  variance 
among the states when making predictions as to future 
healthcare costs and the impact these predictions have on 
the reported numbers. 
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